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1 INTRODUCTION 
i The space age brought with it many new problems in many disciplines. One problem was 
how best to demonstrate that a spacecraft was ready for launch. Testing, including 
environmental testing, was recognized as a necessity. However, the amount and levels of 
testing as well as the requirements for mandatory testing were unknown. This uncertainty 
permitted a wide range of test philosophy, applic;:.tion, and practice. 
At Goddard Space Flight Center the basic test p~~ilosophy included a strong system- 
environmental test program, including testing of the flight spacecraft (references 1 and 2). 
This philosophy did not preclude testing at  subsystem level and below, but made that 
level of testing optional at the discretion of the Project Manager. Previous publications 
(references 3 and 4) have covered some aspects of the test and space results attained with 
this philosophy. 
A previous study, entitled "A Study of First-day Space Malfunctions" (NASA TN D-6474, 
September 197 1, reference 4 )  was made using data from 57 unmanned spacecraft devel- 
oped under the management of the Goddard Space Flight Center. The present study, 
complementing the first, covers the malfunctions which occurred in the same 57 space- 
craft during the first 30 days in space. 
DATA BASE 
The 57 spacecraft used for the data base included the following: 
Meteorological spacecraft (4), 
Astronomical observatories (2), 
Geophysical observatories (6) ,  
Solar observatories (6) ,  
Applications technology spacecraft ( 6 ) ,  
Interplanetary monitoring platforms (7), 
Operational weather spacecraft (1 2), 
Miscellaneous scientific missions ( 14). 
The experiments mu subsystems for these spacecraft have been provided by various organi- 
zations, including Coddard Space Flight Center, other government agencies, universities, 
and aerospace companies. Eighteen of the spacecraft received a full system test at Cod- 
dard Space Flight Center, and 39 received a full system test in a contractor's facility. 
Figure 1 depicts the daily number o f  malfunctions (and failures) for the first month in 
space of the 57 spacecraft. This figure contains I2 more malfunctions than a similar figure 
in reference 4 because of additional information reported. Figure 2 contains :he same 
data but arranged in a cumulative presentation. Figure 3 displays the first month's failures 
by day of occurrence with the failures iden ti fied as experiment o r  spacecraft. 
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Figure 1. Daily Malfunctions for First Month in Space of 57 Unmanned Spacecraft 
The terms problem, failure, and malfunction will be encountered throughout this report, 
and an understanding of the differences between them is necessary. The following defini- 
tions will be applicable: 
0 A problem is any substandard performance o r  partial loss of function which is 
not sufficient t o  be classed as a failure. 
0 A failure is the loss of operation of any function, part, component, or subsys- 
tem, whether or  not redundancy permitted recovery of operation. 
0 A malfunction is any performance outside the specified limits and can be either 
a failure or  a problem. 
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Figure 2. Cumulative Daily Malfunctions for First Month in Space on 57 Spacecraft 
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Figure 3. Daily Failures of Experiments During First Month in Space on the 57 Spacecraft 
Table 1 lists the first-month failures and malfunctions for each year from 1960 t o  1370. 
The data also include the number of spacecraft, together with the number without failures 
or malfunctions. Table 2 categorizes the 88 failures and 154 malfunctions according to  the 
type of device involved, such as mechanical, electrical, electromechanical, pyrotechnic, and 
miscellaneous. Table 3 classifies the failures and malfunctions by spacecraft functions; 
that is, experiments, command and data handling, stabilization and control, power, o r  
structure. 
The data from table 1 on the number of first-month space failures (and malfunctions) perspace- 

































per spacecraft for the first month in space is about 1.5 for the 1 I-year period. There is a 
great deal more variation in the malfunctions per year than in the failures per year. No 
consistent improvement over the 1 I-year period is in evidence for failures or malfunctions. 
The data in figure 4 could be unduly influenced by multiple malfunctions in a few space- 
craft. To examine how many spacecraft were involved, figure 5 was developed t o  show the 
first-month space performance for each year from 1960 to  1970 in a different way. This 
display shows the percent of spacecraft with a failure in the first month in space for each of 
the 11 years. From figure 5 the failures are seen t o  occur in at least 50 percent of the 
spacecraft each year, and in five of the years, 100 percent of the spacecraft had one or 
more failures during the first month in space. Similar data are shown for the first day in 
space for c~nuenient comparison. 
Table 2 
Table 3 
Classification o f  First-month Space Malfunctions From 
57 Spacecraft by Type of Device 
Classification of First-month Space Malfunctions From 
57 Spacecraft by Spacecraft Function 
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F~gure 5. First-day and First-month Space Performance of GSFC Spacecraft, 19601970 
LIMIT ATIONS ON DATA 
The data base for this report is considered to be comprehensive and representative. Never- 
theless. some limitations need to be kept in mind when assessing or utilizing the results. 
The data are necessarily based on reported malfun:tions. Some difference between report- 
ed and actual malfunctions is considered likely, based on the wide spectrum of individuals 
responsible for reporting a malfunction. Although there is no way to  quantify the dif- 
ference, it is thought t o  be small. This situation emphasizes the fact that the malfunction 
data should be considered a minimum. 
The problem of radio-frequency interference (RFI), including spurious commands, has 
been purposely omitted from this study. This specialized problem has varied widely 
among satellites, orbits, location and power of ground-based energy sources, and com- 
nian~l ~ystems. In some cases the problem required a special investigation. For instance. 
an curly spacecraft had 400 anomalous command states during the first year in space. 
l~iclus~on of such data would have obscured the findings of this study. As a final comment, 
RFI t ~ h i g  of a spacecraft before launch is considered as important now, if not more so, 
i as in the eat;) days of the space program. 
Ground station problems arc another category which has not been included in this study. 
In the main, these are temporary, equipment-related, and personnel-related events. When 
a malfunction was definitely ascribed to a spacecraft, it was then included as part of this 
study. 
CRITICALITY OF MALFUNCTIONS I, 
The 154 malfunctions on the 57 spacecraft include items of differing importance or  criti. 
cality and also include critical malfunctions which w e r  not serious because redundancy 
permitted complete fulfillment of the desired function. Another aspect of criticality is 
that the effect of the malfunction on the mission can be completely different from the 
effect on the component. T o  aid in the discussion of criticality. two term.. are defined: 
0 Mission criticality-a measure of the effect of a malfunction on the achievement 
of the mission objectives. The loss is given as a percentage of the mission objec. 
tives. 
Component criticality-a measure of the effect of a malfunction on the operation 
of a component. The loss is givea as a percentage of component operation. 
Mission and component criticality can each be considered with and without reclundancy. 
Figure 6 gives some perspective on the distribution of the malfunctions with respect to 
mission criticality. Seventy-four percent of the malfunctions are classified as minor loss 
to  the mission, assuming no redundancy. With redundancy. the malfi- 7s classified as 
minor loss t o  mission are 86 percent. Another aspect of the benei: 4 from redun- 
dancy is that the benefit is extended to  each of the three r'gnific;. .~ficatiotrs (cata- 
strophic, major, and significant). 
Figure 7 shows the component criticality distributions of malfunctions. 1ooki;ig at the 
distribution, which assumes no redundancy existed, the majority (56 percent) of the mal- 
functions are significant. Further, about 37 percent of the malfunctions are catastrophic 
losses of components. The criticality distribution of malfunctions, which shows the effect 
of redundancy, indicates that redundancy has effectively reduced the percentage of signif- 
icant malfunctions from 56 to  34 percent. Figure 7 further shows that the percentage of 
catastrophic failures has been reduced from 37 to  24 percent through the benefits of redun- 
dancy. 
RELATIONSHIP OF SY STEM-TEST AND FI RST-MONTH SPACE PERFORMANCE 
The data presented haw: shown that the first-month space malfunctions are numerous 
( 1  54 for 57 spacecraft). However, their effect on mission performance has been significant 
in only about 14 percert of the occurrences. The effect on component performance, 011 
the other hsnd, has been significant in over 30 percent of the occurrences. These data 
raise the questions of how good has the system-test program been, and what kind of signif- 








F~gure 6. Mission Criticah*/ of First-month Space Malfunctions for 57 Unmanned Spacecraft 
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Figure 7. Component Criticality of First-month Spacx Malfunctions fur 67 Unmanned Spacueraft 
An overall view of the relationship of space performance to  the system tests is shown in 
figure 8. The data base for this comparison is smaller than the one used up t o  this point. 
The data needed were available for 39 of the 57 spacecraft used in the previous part of the 
report. Figure 8 shows a total of 1043 malful~ctions in the system tests and a total o f  
104 malfunctiors in the first month in space. These totals have been segregated by types 
of devices involved, that is, el~,.trical, mechanical, electromech~iical, and miscellaneous. 
To develop some quantitative comparisons, the data from figure 8 have been used t o  pro- 
duce table 4. It shows the ratio of the failures (and separately, the malfunctions) in systems 
tests to the failures in space. This ratio is 7 when considering the failures for all the devices 
and varies from 3 to  10 for the various types of device:. 
When considering the m a l f ~ x t i o n s  (failures plus problems) for all the devices, thc ratio 
is 10 and varies from 4 t o  13 for the various types of devices. In most cases the ratios 
indicate the system tests are more effective with r.spect to the malfunctions than with 
the failures. The ratio for the mechanical devices is an 2xception to  this generalization 
and indicates that, for mechanical-type devices, the system tests have been more effective 
for screening failures than for total malfuncticns. 
Another comparison of system test performance with the first month in space was made. 
This time the data were segregated by program. Program. as used here, indicates that a11 
the spacecraft had a similar mission objective and usua!ly wert: rllade by the same manu- 
facturer. As sn ex:!mple, all the Interplanetzry Monitoring Platforms (IMPS) were grouped 
as one program. Table 5 shows the ratio, for each program, of the number of failures and 
malfunctions in the cystem tests compared to the failures of the first month in space. In 
all ,rograms the rat~os were higher for malfunctions than for failures. The data show that 
although problems are, in general, more numerous than failures in the s) dem tests, they 
are more effectively eliminated than the failures. An interesting feature of table 5 is the 
data on failures. The failun . Fer spacecraft in the environmental-system tests rmgs from 
5 t o  3 I .5 for the seven diffclinr programs. (Part of this spread can be attributed to  the 
variation in +he nu~ilber of components and complexity.) The range of failures per space- 
craft for the seven programs for the first month in space is 0.9 to 4.2. In each case, ground 
tcst and space, the highest failure rate came from the same program. When this program 
is deleted, the range (and also the standard deviation) of failures for both ground test and 
space is reduced by 45 percent or  more. This program should be considered separately 
when using these data t o  look for trends and relationships. The remaining six programs 
have surprisingly similar performance (for the first month in space) on the basis of the 
failures per spacecraft. 
ANAL'fSIS OF FI RST-MONTH SPACE PERFORMANCE 
An attempt was made t o  analyze the available data t o  determine the reasons for t l ~ c  escape 
of the defects from the system-test screen. Over 50 percent of the defects had to be 
classed as unknown reasons. For the other 50 percent, no promment reason was in evi- 
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Figure 8. Comparison of System-test Performance with First-month Space Performance of 
39 Unmanned Spacecraft 
Table 4 
Compurison of System-test P~rfor111iin~e with the First Month in Space 
of  39 Spucecmft by 1 ype of Dtvice 
K.rtlo ul' Syrtrm-test l:tivtron~tlentaI 
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Conlparison of Systern-test Performance with the First Mon tll in 
Space of 39 Spacc'cr:!ft by Program 
detected previously in the system test, but not diverted; 6 percent had inadequate simula- 
tion; and the balance was distributed among several categories, such as decision to fly as is, 
not possible, not practical. inadequate detection capability, and hardware substituted after 
the system test was performed. 
Another analysis examined the minimum level of hardware assembly at which the defect 
could have been detected. The results of analysis for the minimum level of assembly 
required are as follows: 
System 49 percent, 
Subsystem 29 percent, 
Component 1 8 percent , 
Below component 4 percent. 
These results show that the system-level test is the one most r e q u i ~ d  to detect the 
defects which occurred in the first month in space. On the other hand. over 50 percent 
could have been detected at a level of hardware assembly lower than the system level. 
Three inferences are drawn from these results: 
They emphasize the importance of and validate the GSFC philosophy of 
reliance on the system level of testing. 
The results also show that the system level of testing does not constitute a 
100-percent effective screen. 
Deletion of subsystem (and below) testing increases the risk of a space failure 
by overloading a test screen which is not 100-percent effective. 
The purpose of this report has been the documentation and interpretation of the first- 
month space malfunctions. Some of the data (figures 1 ,  2, and 3) have shown the over- 
riding influence of the first day in space compared to  any other single day. Nevertheless, 
the subsequent days in the first month have been shown to be significant. While the 
separate presentation of all the data for days 2 through 30 has not been practical, some 
features of these malfunctions are worthy of note. 
The percent of space failures attributed to experiments for the first day, first month, and 
days 2 through 30 is 55,60, and 68. respectively. These data point out the most likely 
area for improving space performance. 
Could 3 longer term. simulated space test of the spacecraft eliminate the failures detected 
in days 2 through 30 in space? This question was used on each failure with the following 
results: 22 percent of the failures were judged to be detectable in a longer term, thermal- 
vacuum test; an additional 35 percent of the failures were classed as unknown with respect 
to being detectable in a longer tcrm, thermal-vacuum test; and the balance of the failures, 
43 percent, were such that they were judged to be not detectable in a longer term thermal- 
vacuum test. These results are significantly different than when the same question was ap- 
plied to the firstday failures. A summary of results follows in table 6. 
Table 6 
Percent of Space Failures Detectable in Longer Term, 
Thermal-vacuum Test 
I Percent of Failures Detectable I 
Time When Space Defects Detected I Yes I No ( Unknown 
The results for days 2 through 30 lead to the question, how much longer would the thermal- 
vacuum test need t o  be to eliminate the failures (22 percent) thought to be detectable in 
such a test. The only approach t o  answering the question was to assume that the number of 
space days to  failure would be the same as additional days in a thermal-vacuum test. This 
approach indicated that for the specific spacecraft involved, the average thermal-vacuum test 
would have had to be increased from 15 t o  20 days. A 20-day average test time would also 
be adequate to  take care of the firstday space failures thought to be related to the thermal- 
vacuum environment. Note should be made that the results for day 1 show somewhat 
lower percentages for the Yes and Unknown categories than reported in reference 4, but 
the results agree in the overall indication that most of the firstday failures would not be 









Although the first day in space is by far the one on which a space malfunction 
is most likely to  occur, a significant number of malfunctions have occurred 
during the balance of the first month. 
The malfunctions (likewise, failures) per spacecraft have not shown a decrease 
over the 10-year period. 
A large majority of the malfunctions did not result in significant loss t o  the 
component o r  the mission. 
For most devices 5 t o  10  times as many failures are found in the system 
tests as occur in the first month in space. 
The majority of failures occur in electricahtype devices. 
88 





a The spacecraft function most likely to encounter failure is an experiment, with 
command and data handling next most likely. 
a The GSFC philosophy of requiring system-level tests of flight spacecraft has 
been vital in obtaining an excellent space performance record. hut it has not 
been applied so conservatively as to  preclude all space failures. 
a Reliance solely on system-level testing is not merited from this study. 
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